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In the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster every effort is being made to determine the susceptibility 
of Space Shuttle elements to debris impacts. Ice and frost debris is formed around the aft heat shield closure 
of the orbiter and liquid hydrogen feedlines. This debris has been observed to liberate upon lift-off of the 
shuttle and presents potentially dangerous conditions to the Space Shuttle Main Engine. This paper describes 
the testing done to determine the impact tolerance of the Space Shuttle Main Engine nozzle coolant tubes to 
ice strikes originating from the launch pad or other parts of the shuttle. 
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I. Introduction 
T h e  Space Shuttle Main Engine is a reusable liquid rocket engine propelled with liquid hydrogen and liquid 
oxygen. The 3 engines on the aft end of the Space Shuttle orbiter operate for 8.5 minutes during ascent to orbit of 
the Space Transportation System (STS). The converging-diverging regeneratively fuel-cooled nozzle on the SSME 
expands and increases the velocity of the combustion exhaust gases. The nozzle is approximately 113 inches in 
length and has a 94-inch exit diameter'. 
The nozzle is manufactured from 1,080 individual A286 Stainless Steel coolant tubes. These tubes are thin- 
walled and roughly %" in diameter brazed together and to the structural jacket'. The nickel-alloy structural jacket 
has a series of nine structural hatbands for hoop strength. The fuel is supplied to the nozzle from the high-pressure 
fuel turbopump at 6,000 psi. It enters the nozzle from the diffuser and is then routed through the downcomer lines 
into the aft manifold3. The fuel is routed upwards in  a single pass through the nozzle tubes to cool the inner wall of 
the nozzle increasing in temperature by 400" F in ahout two milliseconds'. The hydrogen collects in the forward 
manifold then onto the mixer bowl to combine with the bypass flow from the coolant control valve. The nozzle 
configuration can be found in Figure 14. 
Liquid Hydrogen at -423 "F is used during chill-down and is the propellant for the Space Shuttle Main Engines 
(SSME) on the Shuttle Orbiter. As a result of the cold temperatures and generally warm humid air on the launch 
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pad, ice and frost (hereafter referred to as ice) form around the heat shield retainer ring and LH2 feedlines. During 
lift-off, vibration and heat separates the ice from the retainer and LH2 feedlines and it has been observed to impact 
the nozzle, both jacket and bare tubes. Another debris source that presents potentially dangerous conditions to the 
nozzle is rust scale from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch pad. 
If the impact causes a leak in the cooling tubes the engine control system makes up for the loss of fuel flow to 
the main combustion chamber by increasing the LOX flow rate. There are four possible outcomes depending on the 
leak rate. 1) A small fuel leak rate is acceptable and would not affect the mission. 2) A greater fuel leak rate would 
cause an early main engine cutoff (MECO) due to low LOX level. Using the OMS engines could make up the low 
cutoff velocity’. 3) If the fuel leak rate were too large for the OMS engines to make up, the mission could be lost. 
4) If leakage is large enough, the preburner mixture ratio and therefore temperature would increase causing a redline 
to be triggered by the preburner and the mission could be lost. 
In order to fully understand the effects of ice and rust debris impacts to the SSME nozzle, testing was conducted 
at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Traditional impact methods with air projectile guns were not 
applicable to the low velocity impact cases as required. Instead, the drop tube within the Dynamic Test Facility at 
MSFC was utilized to obtain velocities up to 120 feet per second. Similar operating conditions of the nozzle were 
replicated including hardware configurations, manufacturing techniques, and pressures. The primary objective of 
testing was to determine the tolerances of the nozzle to ice and rust debris and obtain data for dynamic and impact 
modeling correlations. 
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Figure 1. Space Shuttle Main Engine Nozzle Configuration. 
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11. Testing Overview and Configuration 
A. Dynamic Test Facility Drop Tube 
SSME impact testing was performed at the Dynamic Test Facility Drop Tower at MSFC. The drop tower 
comprises a 10-inch diameter, 345-foot drop tube that has various ports for drops at multiple heights within the tube. 
The tube was configured with two high-tension cables located in the center of the tube, held in place with fabricated 
plates for both the top and the bottom. The cables were tensioned with threaded rods attached to the plates and drop 
tube flanges (both the top and bottom plate). A sized hole was machined in the bottom plate in which the sabot 
would be stripped and the projectile would continue through onto the test article. 
Figure 2. Drop Tube Configuration. 
A sled system was designed to fit the width of the cables and was used to guide the prqjectiles down the cable. 
As part of the sled system, foam sabots were attached to the underside of the sled to hold the projectile in place. The 
sabot had a countersunk hole machined in center that was sized for the 1.5” x 0.75” cross section ice projectiles. The 
sabots were designed in such a way to fracture symmetrically and release the projectile normal to the test article. 
The same sabot configuration was used to hold the rust samples and Inconel wedges i n  place. 
In order to determine at which heights the sled system would need to be dropped to achieve the required 
velocity, a series of Calibration Drops were performed using a surrogate specimen. The surrogate specimen was 
manufactured from MCC-1 cork and had an identical cross section of the ice samples, as well as a density similar to 
low-density ice. Following a series of drops, the height of each drop was plotted against the velocity calculated and a 
function was developed to fit this data. This data is compared with the calculated value. for a similar specimen in  
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Figure 3. The error in the graph is due to slight configuration differences between the actual test set-up and the 
calculated model. The primary factors were the cross-sectional area of sled system, and the friction between the sled 
and the tensioned cables. 
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Figure 3. Determination of Required Drop Height for Expected Velocity. 
The function developed according with the sled configuration can be found in Equation 1. This equation was 
used as a rough estimate to determine an approximate drop height to obtain the expected impact velocity on the test 
panel for each drop. 
(1 8.7 x In x - 4.6) + (9.6 x x ' . ~ ~ )  
V =  (1) 
3 
L 
where: 
v = Estimated Impact Velocity in feet per second, fps 
x = drop height in feet. ft 
R. Test Article and Holding Fixture Configurations 
The test panel was a sectioned panel from depleted flight and development hardware. The two nozzles that were 
sectioned for purpose of this testing were 2032 and 5009. Two types of panels were used for the testing program: a 
panel with bare tubes and a panel with the jacket section included. This hardware went through identical 
manufacturing processes as a flight nozzle. The panel with hare tubes was sectioned from the IO'" bay of the nozzle 
and the tubes were cut off directly below the 9"' hatband. A closeout manifold for the forward end of the panel was 
fabricated and brazed to the tubes. The aft manifold was closed out with machined bosses welded into the main 
manifold and the closeout ring. The manifold boss was tapped to accommodate AN fittings in order to prcssurize the 
panel to 6,000 psi with water. The large panel was section from the aft end of the nozzle and cut just above the 8"' 
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hatband. A similar manifold was fabricated to closeout the tubes and bosses for the aft manifold. A total of 22 panels 
were tested, including 20 small panels and 2 large panels. 
Figure 4. Small and Large Test Panel Configurations. , 
The fixture to restrain the panels was fabricated to accommodate various impact angles. The panel was held in 
the fixture by four primary attach points. Two bolts were threaded into the tube closeout manifold and two brackets 
were tightened to hold the aft manifold in place. A torque of 42 lbf-ft was applied to the brackets on each panel 
installation for model correlation purposes. The fixture was also designed to accommodate both the large and small 
test panels. The large panels used an additional structural support through the ninth hatband. In most test cases. the 
panel was kept in fixture for subsequent tests to allow for repeatability. There were two configurations of the fixture 
and test-article set-up. The first set-up was configured with the fixture and panel normal (90-degrees) to the debris 
direction of travel, while other test configuration was 45-degrees relative to the direction of projectile travel. The 
panel and fixture configuration can be found in Error! Reference source not found.. 
C. Instrumentation 
The test article included instrumentation to measure strain, temperature, and dynamic data. A total of three 
thermocouples (two on the test article, one near the drop tube), two accelerometers, and four strain gauges were 
included on the test article. All strain gauges and thermocouples were installed on the hot-wall side of the test 
article. Some cases where access was limited, the accelerometers were installed on the cold-wall side of the nozzle 
not to interfere with the impact area. All instrumentation was sampled at 200,000 samples per second. The 
instrumentation configuration installed on a test article can be found in Error! Reference source not found.. 
In addition to the data acquisition system, high speed video cameras were used to capture velocity data and 
analyze the mechanics of each drop. The three cameras were positioned to: view the entire panel, a close up of the 
impact zone, and a camera above the impact zone to calculate the prqjectile velocity. 
D. Debris and Test Projectiles 
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Three primary sources of debris were tested in the nozzle impact testing. This included high density ice, low 
density ice and rust scale. Additional testing was completed with machined Inconel wedges as damage limit testing 
for rust. This is an unexpected debris and used only for demonstration purposes. The density required in the test 
plan for low density ice was 37k4 pcf. The high 
density ice was specified to be 57.5 23 pcf. All ice 
projectiles were weighed and handled using 
special gloves to prevent any degradation or 
melting. The time in which the ice projectiles were 
exposed to atmospheric conditions outside of the 
freezer unit was minimized to five minutes or less. 
Rust scale was selected from liberated debris 
sent up to MSFC from the KSC launch pad. The 
sizes selected for testing were above the current 
requirement for allowable sizes on the pad. The 
allowable sizes for rust on the pad are roughly that 
of a quarter. 
Figure 6. Small Panel in Holding Fixture. 
Figure 6. Instrumentation Configuration for Test Articles. 
Inconel wedges were used for damage limit 
testing to impart the maximum kinetic energy into 
the nozzle coolant tubes. Three types of Inconel 
wedges were used in order to obtain the various 
required energies. Dimensions of all three wedges 
were the same however; holes were drilled into 
each wed&e to vary the weights of each. The 
impactin& edge of the wedge had a width of 
0.020’ for each of the wedges. The corners of the 
impacting wedges were rounded. 
111. General Testing Procedures 
The SSME Nozzle Impact test program was 
initiated in August 2004. A test plan was written 
by ER32/Combustion Devices and approved by 
Level 111 (Space Shuttle Main. Engine Project 
Office) and Level I1 (Space Shuttle Program 
Office). The drop tower at the Dynamic Test Facility (Building 4550 at MSFC) was prepared for drop testing 
starting in October 2004. This included removing existing instrumentation and tube port protrusions that would 
disturb the descent path of the projectiles. The lower level facility i n  which the nozzle panel and instrumentation 
would be present within was set-up to accommodate the test articles. 
Two high-tensioned guide cables were secured within the drop tube using a fabricated plate for both the top and 
bottom of the tube flanges. A guide sled and sabot system was designed and fabricated to hold the projectiles central 
to the tube. A series of test drops were conducted to validate various sled and sabot configurations. After the sled 
and sabot design was finalized, an additional series of testing was conducted to determine the heights required to 
obtain various target velocities with the configuration. This was done using an identical density surrogate specimen 
as the low density ice projectiles. 
Following approval of safety and quality inspections of the test procedures and facilities. and a test readiness 
review. a series of calibration drops were performed using low density and high density ice projectiles. These drops 
were identical to the actual drops in the full test matrix and for all intensive purposes. could he used as actual drop 
data. The panels were fully pressurized and all instrumentation and video data was recorded. 
A typical drop test would be initiated by the installation of the nozzle panel into the test fixture. All 
instrumentation, including thermocouples. accelerometers, and strain &auges were connected to the data acquisition 
6 
American Institute o f  Aeronautics and Astronautics 
system. The pressure lines were connected to the pressure system and a leak check of the lines and nozzle panel was 
conducted. While these activities were taking place, the drop technicians would set-up any sledhabot equipment 
needed for that particular drop. The technicians would also start to measure and weigh the projectile. If ice was 
being used, the projectile would remain in the freezer until the test was ready to be conducted. Pre-test photographs 
and observations would be recorded of the nozzle panel condition. After all personnel were clear, the drop room was 
closed to prevent anyone from entering during the test. 
The technicians would take the projectile to the port required of the particular drop test and install in the sabot in 
preparation for the drop. Pressurization to the nozzle panel would begin. At the same time, the video and 
instrumentation engineers would start recording the data for the drop. The panel would be illuminated with high 
intensity lighting in preparation for the drop. The test conductor would initiate communication and request a 
confirmation from all test engineers and technicians to begin the test. The drop was then performed. After 
confirmation that the projectile had impacted the nozzle panel, the nozzle panel was immediately depressurized and 
verified that pressures were at safe levels. All recording of video and instrumentation data would be stopped. The 
drop room would then be cleared for personnel to enter and the high intensity lighting would be turned off. 
Personnel would then conduct post-test inspections of the nozzle panel. This included post-test photographs, 
visual inspection and contour inspections for any damage. All data was recorded on a test data sheet. The video test 
engineer would calculate the velocity and an evaluation was made to repeat the test or continue with the subsequent 
tests in the matrix. An identical process was followed for each drop test conducted on small and large impact test 
panels. 
IV. Hardware Inspections and Test Data 
Pre-test and Post-test inspections were performed previous to and immediately following each drop test. This 
included both a visual inspection of the impacted nozzle panel and contour inspection with one’s hands. The 
inspector was looking for any changes in the characteristics of the nozzle tubes, including, but not limited to crach,  
buckling, dents, indentations, surface roughness, and ruptures. Pre-test and post-test photographs were taken for 
each drop test to keep records of each condition. 
A total of 58 tests were conducted using ice projectiles; 20 calibration tests, 14 tests with low density ice, and 24 
tests with high density ice. None of the tests showed any damage with drops using either low-density or high-density 
ice projectiles on either the small (bare tubes) or large (jacket section) test nozzle panels up to maximum test 
velocity of 120 feet per second. In all drops the energy was dissipated by the ice in which the ice would shatter. 
A total of 5 drops were completed using rust debris at various masses and velocities. All rust samples were 
dropped with the sharp edges normal to the nozzle test panel, impacting across the tubes circumferentially. Post-test 
inspections of rust drops revealed slight surface scratches and rust residue on the nozzle tubes. A majority of the 
residue and scratches were removed by wiping with a dry cloth or one’s fingers. When the inspectors performed the 
contour inspections, a slight mark scratch could be felt, but also easily missed if rust residue had not been present to 
identify the area. One drop revealed a minor dent in  one nozzle tube, but no ruptures were present. 
Damage limit testing was performed with Inconel wedges to understand the energy which would cause a tube to 
rupture. A total of ten tests were completed with the Inconel wedges. The purpose of testing with the wedges was to 
determine the kinetic energy required to rupture nozzle coolant tubes. This was classified as damage limit testing. 
This is an unexpected debris source and only used for demonstration purposes. Nozzle coolant tubes demonstrated 
impact tolerance with Inconel wedges up to a normal kinetic energy of 75.9 lb-ft (total energy) and a corresponding 
velocity of 105.6 f p s  without any tube ruptures. The damage limit testing with Inconel wedges revealed that ruptures 
occurred above a normal kinetic energy of 83.8 Ib-ft (total energy) and corresponding velocity of 110.9 fps This 
energy was spread across a total of six nozzle tubes for both cases. This data can be found in  Figure 7. The normal 
kinetic energy was found using Equation 2. 
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Figure 7. Total Kinetic Energies for Inconel Damage Limit Testing. 
mv 
2s c 
KE = -x[cos(90 - I?)]* (2) 
where: 
KE = Normal Kinetic Energy in foot-pounds, lb-ft 
m = mass in pounds, lb. 
v = velocity in feet per second, fps 
gc = gravitational constant, ft/sec2 
n = angle of nozzle test article in degrees, O 
An incident on STS-93 caused the rupture of three nozzle coolant tubes during mainstage of the flight. A LOX 
post pin ejected from a deactivated LOX post impacted the hot-wall side of the nozzle. This caused a fuel leak and a 
MECO at 0.16 seconds prior to the planned cut-off at T+ 8 minutes 30 second?. The result of this was failure 
scenario 2 as outlined in the Introduction. Aerothermal analysis was completed and the energy that ruptured the 
tubes was determined, Taking this analysis for the 1.5 gram pin at a velocity of 700 - 900 feet per second, the 
corresponding energy that caused the three tubes to rupture ranges from 25.2 Ibf-ft to 41.6 Ibf-ft’. Since this energy 
was spread across three tubes, the energy per tube that caused a rupture ranges from 8.4 Ibf-ft to 13.9 Ihf-ft. 
The test data indicated that it took a normal kinetic energy of at least 14 Ibf-ft to rupture a single nozzle coolant 
tube. This is the lowest energy that ruptured at least one nozzle coolant tube. This data is compared with the original 
analysis from the STS-93 LOX post pin failure. The test data falls within the range of the calculated LOX post pin 
failure and provides a reasonable validation. 
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V. Conclusion 
The Space Shuttle Main Engine nozzle coolant tubes were subjected to ice impact at energies much higher than 
would be expected during a launch. None of the ice impact tests resulted in damage to the nozzle cooling tubes. 
The testing also shows that the nozzle can withstand impacts from rust at sizes greater than allowed on the launch 
facililties at KSC. The damage limit testing with Inconel wedges proved to be a successful validation of previous 
analysis work. The shuttle program continues to look for other debris sources. If other sources a determined to be a 
threat to the SSME, further impact testing may be required. 
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